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This anthology probably will not fulfill a need 
felt by a great number of philosophers; this, however, 
is not to the discredit of the editors, but rather to 
that of the fairly large body of unknowing philosophers. 
While it is perhaps not patent that parapsychological 
or "psi" phenomena have any or indeed severe philosoph-
ical implications, surely the fact that a number of the 
more acute philosophical minds of this century who have 
immersed themselves in the relevant data, both experi-
mental and spontaneous, has taken there to be; it should 
be sufficient to spark more than passing curiosity. To 
play the proverbial ostrich, head buried in the sand, 
is a certain way of not discovering whether there.is 
anything to be alarmed about. And it must be admitted 
that a substantial percentage of philosophers has as-
sumed this posture concerning parapsychological phen-
omena. 
It may come as something of a surprise to many, at 
least in the United States, that the British Society for 
Psychical Research and its American counterpart have been 
headed by the likes of Henry Sidgwick, William James, 
C D . Broad, H.H. Price, and Curt Ducasse; that contem-
porary "empiricist" philosophers such as Anthony Flew 
and Michael Scriven have devoted a great deal of atten-
tion to the issues of the "paranormal" (the former hav-
ing written a book on psi research, the latter having 
founded the first parapsychological research group in 
the Southern hemisphere); or that Kant's curious but in-
frequently-read Dreams of a Spirit-Seer had as partial 
inspiration for its subject matter the bizarre, sensi-
tive, and Renaissance-charactered scholar, Swedenborg. 
In any case, this volume is welcome for other rea-
sons. While for sometime there has been scattered 
throughout the literature a reasonably "broad" spec-
trum of fine and incisive papers, none of the best of 
them has been brought together in a collection of pure-
ly philosophical readings. The compilation itself then 
is laudable. But, more crucially, an anthology of 
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papers by clear-headed thinkers on the subject will serve 
the curious but cautious as an antidote to the revulsion 
that a perusal of the ubiquitous pseudo-philosophical 
tracts generates. Though not all of the papers are of 
high quality, most are quite interesting; this book will 
certainly fulfill its purpose as a respectable text for 
a course in the perplexing but exciting field of the 
philosophy of parapsychology. 
The text itself is divided into five sections con-
cerning the relation between psi and philosophy, cogni-
tion, precognition, survival, and science. In the first, 
Broad's paper, "The Relation of Psychical Research to 
Philosophy," though somewhat dated (1949), is a useful 
introductory piece on the relevance of psi to philosoph-
ical thought. He constructs a list of very general 
principles, heterogeneous in their logical status, 
which, he claims, constitute a kind of conceptual frame-
work for the educated Western man's and scientist's 
"world." These tenets bear on causation, the mode of 
operation of our intentions and desires on the physical 
world, the relation between mind and brain, and the man-
ner in which we come to know about events which we have 
not ourselves experienced. That each of these is uni-
versally held is false; but that most of them are widely 
assumed and yet appear prima facie to have counterex-
amples in one or another psi phenomenon (telepathy and 
clairvoyance, either post-cognitive, contemporary, or 
pre-cognitive, and psychokinesis) is sufficient to war-
rant Broad's stating them. That some of them are not 
purely conceptual but rather deeply entrenched empirical 
principles may cause raised eyebrows among those who are 
especially sensitive to philosophers' overstepping their 
disciplinary bounds. Broad's comment concerning this 
reaction is worthy of notice: 
I think that there are some definitions of "phi-
losophy" according to which it would not be con-
cerned with these [parapsychologicalJ or any other 
newly discovered facts, no matter how startling . . 
[but] if we can judge of what philosophy is by what 
great philosophers have done in the past . . , phi-
losophy involves at least two . . . closely con-
nected activities which I call synopsis and syn-
thesis. Synopsis is the deliberate viewing to-
gether of aspects of human experience which, for 
one reason or another are generally kept apart by 
by the plain man and even by the professional 
scientist or scholar. The object of synopsis is 
to try to find out how these various aspects are 
interrelated. Synthesis is the attempt to supply 
a coherent set of concepts and principles which 
shall cover satisfactorily all the regions of fact 
which have been viewed synoptically. (pp. 11-12) 
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And also to the point is the treatment Price gives in a paper dealt with later: 
In the early stages of any inquiry it is a mis-
take to lay down a hard and fast distinction be-
tween a scientific investigation of the facts and 
philosophical reflection about them. . . . At later 
stages the distinction is right and proper. But if 
it is drawn too soon and too rigorously those later 
stages will never be reached. (p. 109) 
Hundle's admirably sane paper, "Strange Facts in 
Search of A Theory," stresses that the central expli-
canda of psi research, telepathy and clairvoyance, do 
not wear their ontological character on their faces. 
This is a deceptively simple point for I suspect that 
more than a few philosophers who find themselves in-
clined to dismiss parapsychology do so because they as-
sume that to admit the reality of its subject matter is 
ipso facto to embrace some philosophical position, for 
example, Cartesian dualist interactionism, which has 
since been discarded for other reasons. Definitions 
of telepathy as awareness by one mind of the contents of 
another without a physical medium are question-begging 
and encourage the recoil of the incredulous. 
In the second section, on cognition, two widespread 
but misleading models of telepathy and clairvoyance are 
subjected to criticism. The first is that they are 
forms of perception (consider the moniker "ESP") and the 
second that they constitute forms of knowledge, either 
by acquaintance or discursive. To understand why such 
accounts are inadequate, let us look at an apt compari-
son Price gives in his paper "Some Philosophical Ques-
tions Concerning Telepathy and Clairvoyance" between ä 
case of telepathic exchange and that of a person's get-
ting the flu from another. My flu symptoms, though 
caused by your flu, need not be of the same kind as 
yours. I have a sore throat and a cough while you have 
a runny nose and sinus congestion. In like manner, with 
respect to telepathy, perhaps while you are imagining 
Joe DiMaggio, I may come to image a baseball, or, better 
yet, the sound of a cracking baseball bat. Neither am 
I in acquaintance with your "sensa" nor are the modal-
ities of my sensa and yours the same. Or perhaps I have 
no sensa at all but just blurt out "World Series." If 
we are separated by some distance, I may have absolutely 
no idea what the origin of my musings are. Would we 
want to term this "knowledge"? Further, if we reflect 
on Zener card-guessing in experimental situations where 
someone amasses a string of veridical calls far exceed-
ing chance expectation, say, eight out of twenty-five 
over thousands of runs. Where chance would be five out 
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of twenty-five, would we be likely to ascribe the "suc-
cess" to a faculty which could bring us knowledge? 
Among the issues which have most exercised the the-
oretical imagination of philosophers concerned with psi, 
precognition stands preeminent. The logical conundrums 
generated by the characterization of it as "non-infer-
ential awareness of the future" have driven Broad to 
comment that if it is not logically impossible then • • 
there is good evidence for it and G. Spencer Brown, upon 
seeing the statistical data, to argue that there must be 
something amiss with the statistical notion of chance. 
Just as with non-precognitive telepathy and clairvoyance, 
some philosophical objections to its intelligibility are 
rooted in definitions of it. If it is to be understood 
as perception of the future, and one holds a causal 
theory, we are overcome with the uneasy feeling that the 
future is, in Flew's phrase, already "here" or, at any 
rate, "there." 
Broad's long paper, "The Philosophical Implications 
of Foreknowledge," is an extended attempt to so charac-
terize precognition that it is logically possible. We 
do not, he says, perceive the future; rather we "pre-
hend" an image of the future, just as in memory (or, for 
that matter I suppose, in post-cognitive telepathy or 
clairvoyance) we "prehend" an image of the past and not 
the past itself. Broad's account is somewhat marred by 
his reliance on an imagist theory of memory; but that 
aside, we can give vis-a-vis memory some kind of causal 
theoretical account through our having been at one time 
"present" in what is now the past. How can we offer an 
analogue for precognition without postulating a future 
event as cause of something present, i.e., our prehend-
ing of an image? Broad asks us to conceive of multiple 
time dimensions at the intersection of which we find the 
causative event to be future in one dimension but not so 
in the other(s). The Humean restriction on the tem-
poral location of causes being relaxed, we are able to 
have our cake in one dimension and eat it in another. 
Ducasse, in "A Theory of the Relation of Causality 
to Precognition," tries to sidestep these puzzles over 
causation by employing a quasi-Kantian tack that phys-
ical events possess no intrinsic temporality, i.e., in 
themselves they are neither past, present, or future. 
They become present by getting perceived by someone. 
Thus the very same event can be present twice: when it 
is "precognized" in a dream say and when it is exper-
ienced in the light of day. Whereas Ducasse offers a 
story about time so that it is fundamentally psych-
ological in nature and thus circumvents the stickiness 
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encountered above, Bob Brier, while not arguing pre-
cognition to necessitate bäckward causation, argues the 
latter to be logically possible given ;just a single di-
mension of time. 
One might well wonder how the question of the sur-
vival of bodily death could wend its way into being a 
concern for those investigating telepathy or clairvoy-
ance. The reasons are, at least in part, historical* 
The survival hypothesis got invoked by quite a number 
of theorists early on in psychical research to solve 
those baffling cases where some person seemed to obtain 
information not possessed orignally by himself or any-
one else living. And the phenomena of "hauntings," 
apparitions, deathbed and otherwise, coupled with some 
of the more astounding mediumistic deliverances (e.g., 
the Verrall, Piper et al. "cross-correspondences") 
stimulated the acceptance of survival as a plausible 
theory. However the appearance of mediums apparently 
possessed of remarkable capacities for "culling" in-
formation from living and extant sources diminished the 
necessity for, if not the attractiveness of the theory. 
The logical perplexities intricately bound up with 
the survival question have engaged philosophers indepen-
dently of such hair-raising mediumistic exploits. Thus 
there exists a substantial literature on personal iden-
tity, and, the puzzle of whether bodily identity, or, 
for that matter, a body at all is necessary for the 
ascription of such. Penelhum, in "Survival and Disem-
bodied Existence," which, incidentally, is a chapter 
from .the 1970 book of the same name, echoes Shoemaker's 
defence of the memory criterion for personal identity 
as an essentially dependent one. The bodily criterion 
is the more fundamental. Flew, in "Is There A Case for 
Disembodied Survival?", argues roughly the same thing. 
At minimum this line informs us that if indeed anything 
survives death it cannot be a person; maximally it tells 
us that the very notion of consciousness is conceptu-
ally tied to that of the body. It is for this reason 
that Flew suggests the "astral" body theory to have the 
least logical difficulties while simultaneously having 
no other support for it. This much is relatively old 
hat for those who have followed the debate over the last 
twenty or so years. 
Both Broad's "Personal Identity and Survival" and 
Ducasse's "How Stands the Case for the Reality of Sur-
vival?" have it that it is at least logically possible 
for a center of consciousness to survive death. Ducasse 
in fact holds that survival of such is probable. Curi-
ously enough, some of the fascinating turns that the 
dialogue over personal identity haye taken, thanks in 
large part to several of Derek Parfit's intriguing 
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papers, have precursors in various of Broad's papers on 
the subject of survival, and, in particular, the one 
included here. A fair percentage of those cases for 
the explanation of which the survival theory has been 
made use of do not require the postulation of the sur-
vival of a full-fledged person. Consider the cases of 
some hauntings where, if we are inclined towards the 
survival hypothesis, we seem required to countenance 
a kind of moronic being, ludicrously fixated on regions 
of a room or doomed, Sisyphus-like, to pound on walls. 
Some mediumistic phenomena suggest, again given a sur-
vivalist interpretation, partial coalescence of con-
sciousnesses of deceased human beings or the obliter-
ation of normal cognitive capacities. For those who 
suspect that supporters of the survival hypothesis are 
merely engaging in wishful thinking Broad is healthy 
reading in that he conjures up a number of quite dis-
turbing, indeed terrifying, scenarios for post-mortem 
existence to fit the present data. "It is worthwhile 
to remember, though there is nothing we can do about it, 
that the world as it really is may easily be a far nas-
tier place than it would be if scientific materialism 
were the whole truth and nothing but the truth." 
The capability of parapsychology's meeting such 
standards as to be deemed "scientific" is the ques-
tion treated in the book's final section. Are there 
any methodological principles or ontological assumptions 
peculiar to psi research? While accepting for para-
psychology the standard formal requirements for exper-
imentation, Beloff, in "Parapsychology and Its Neigh-
bors," disavows for it what he thinks are the "phys-
icalist" presuppositions of the other recognized sci-
ences. He does, rightly I think, reject the modish 
lingo of a "paraphysics" with its "psi fields" and "psi 
energy"; and also the converse tactic, made use of by 
some writers anxious to legitimize the study of psi, of 
claiming that contemporary physics has been "spirit-
ualized." Yet his eschewing of the possibility of a 
physical explanation of psi is ill-founded. Paz't of 
the difficulty has to do with the ambiguity surround-
ing the word "physical." In the philosophy of mind, it 
has a fairly delimited connotation, i.e., physiological. 
Insofar as it pertains to physics, it may mean, simply, 
conforming to or being an instance of a conceptual model 
in contemporary physics. In a more open-ended sense it 
may refer to the character of whatever scheme of en-
tities some future physics will countenance. Beloff 
takes the "information" problem to be telling against 
a physical interpretation of psi. This problem com-
prises the explaining of a clairvoyant or telepathic 
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subject's ability to discriminate a target from an in-
finite number of other objects in his environment. But 
as Scriven and Meehl point out in their concise paper, 
"The Compatibility of Science and E S P j " what the infor-
mation problem is a problem for is a simple radiation 
theory of psi. But no simple radiation theory can ex-
plain the Pauli principle either; this does not lead uo 
to assert that we are there dealing with "nonphysical" 
phenomena or that no future physics will be able to ac-
count for such. We simply don't know enough about these 
things, i.e., psi phenomena, to do much better than de-
scribe them negatively. Thus telepathy and clairvoyance 
are the obtaining of information from persons or objects 
in none of the known ways. Beyond this it becomes very 
difficult to feel assured that we can make any decisive 
or final statements about the explanatory scheme appro-
priate for them. 
Of some interest is the question of whether psi 
phenomena could adjudicate between rival theories of 
mind. that they can has been taken for granted in the 
past by psi researchers. V/hen Sidgwick and Myers found-
ed the British Society for Psychical Research it was 
their hope to vindicate some form of Cartesian dualism 
over against the epiphenomenalism of their day. Mundle, 
while not plumping for idealism, suggests that of the 
classical theories of mind, idealism perhaps is most 
economical in accounting for both telepathy and clair-
voyance. Most of the physicalist accounts of telepathy 
offered by contemporary philosophers of mind suffer from 
their inabiltiy to simultaneously take care of clairvoy-
ance. Gardner Murphy's "Are There Any Solid Facts in 
Psychical Research?" portrays the state of psi research 
as badly in need of some unifying theoretical model. 
And he considers that the construction of theories of 
mind are of paramount importance. But contemporary 
philosophy of mind, despite the strong fashion of func-
tionalism, is really in no great position to come to the 
theoretical aid of psychical research. Indeed, David 
Armstrong, whose A Materialist Theory of Hind catalyzed 
philosophical psychology, takes the findings of psych-
ical research to be "a small black cloud on the horizon 
of a Materialist theory of mind." This caution is based 
on the possibility, however slight, that no future 
physics will be able to handle psi. But we discussed 
this point above. 
The weakest papers in the anthology are the last 
two. LeShan's "Individual Realities: Commonsense, 
Science, and Mysticism" is a confused amalgam of awk-
ward logic and the unjustified importation into theori-
zing about psi of ethico-religious concerns. He baldly 
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asserts that there is an incompatibility between the 
common-sense viewpoint of the world and what he dubs the 
"clairvoyant" perspective. According to the former, 
psi phenomena simply cannot occur. But they do occur. 
"We must do something about this paradox." What he pro-
poses is that we simply allow there to be two different 
ways of looking at reality, each "valid in its own 
right." Thus, on the former, free will exists, while 
on the latter, it does not; on the former an event is 
good, neutral, or evil, but on the latter, good and 
evil are illusory and so on. There are a whole variety 
of points to be made here. First, it is not completely 
clear that the common sense view of the world, if there 
really is any such consistent and uniform animal, makes 
any provision for the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
psi phenomena. LeShan cites Broad's discussion of Basic 
Limiting Principles in support of his point. But I do 
not think that these limiting principles constitute the 
common-sense view of the world or that Broad claimed 
them to do so. They formed the outlook of the educated 
Western man and scientist. These need not be the same. 
Secondly, the difficulty for this scheme of differing 
viewpoints is that either their fundamental tenets con-
tradict one another, in which case we have a violation 
of the principle of contradiction in speaking of one 
reality different aspects of which the man of common-
sense and the "clairvoyant" perceive; or they do not 
contradict one another, in which case there is no para-
dox in simultaneously adopting both. More urgently 
though, I am somewhat concerned with LeShan's casting 
of the second viewpoint above as "clairvoyant" and not 
simply "mystical." There is no necessary connection be-
tween psi phenomena and mysticism either in terms of 
what the psychic or mystic would say about themselves 
or their experiences, or in terms of what they must 
say about themselves or their experiences; or in terms 
of the kind of explanation we might try to give for the 
occurrence of either psi phenomena or mystical exper-
ience. LeShan*s making of this tie is symptomatic of 
what I take to be a dangerous trend among some contem-
porary writers to invest psychic phenomena with reli-
gious significance. This is the fervor of spirit-
ualism in new clothes, and if this sort of evangelism 
comes to predominate, parapsychology will again find 
itself suspect among the very people whose aid it seeks 
to enlist, that is, researchers in the physical sciences 
There is some evidence to show that some persons 
who have demonstrated psi abilities have those abilitie: 
enhanced by entering various "altered states of consci-
ousness." From both spontaneous and experimental cases 
we know that telepathy can occur in situations of ex-
treme distress or powerful emotion, in hypnogogic state 
and in semi-trance (thus the expression "trance medium" 
Tart wishes to argue that we can fruitfully, and in a 
manner consistent with "the essence of Scientific 
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method," examine such altered states. But this is not 
to be understood just in the sense that we might, for 
example, give a subject LSD and then test his motor 
skill or cognitive capacities; rather, if I understand 
him, Tart suggests that an examiner can come to pro-
nounce competently on the accuracy, of the subject's 
description of the reality he claims to come into con-
tact with when in such states. This requires that the 
examiner himself enter the state in question in order to 
encounter this mode of reality, with its own "logic and 
principles." The assumption then is that in such states 
we do not inaccurately perceive things, but that we ac-
curately perceive things in a different way. I do not 
wish to maintain that inducing such states and examining 
our experiences therein cannot be of some value. But I 
do wonder whether that value is in any sense philosoph-
ical, 'liiere are knotty problems indeed concerning the 
ontological status of dreams and hallucinations, but it 
is not evident that in dreaming or hallucinating we must 
be said, in any important sense , to be coming into con-
tact with another portion of reality or that we are 
viewing the same reality from another "equally valid" 
perspective.. One is reminded of Hobbes' pithy comment 
that if a man tells him that last night God spoke to 
him in a dream, this is "no more than to say that last 
night he dreamed that God spoke to him." 
